In Headquarters Hotel v. LBV Hotel, Judge Davis ruled that Headquarters rejected LBV’s offer to sell a property interest under a right-of-first-offer provision by refusing to execute a confidentiality agreement included with the offer.
Under an agreement between the parties, LBV has an estate for years in the real estate owned by Headquarters at 154 Berkeley Street, Boston, until 2131 (2131 is not a typo). The agreement includes a right-of-first-offer provision. Under that provision, if either party wants to market its interest to third parties, the selling party must first offer the interest to the other party at the same price and on the same terms the selling party would offer to third parties.
In Metal Seal Precision, Ltd. v. Sensata Technologies, Inc., Metal Seal sued Sensata for allegedly breaching the parties’ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which required Sensata to purchase minimum quantities of metal components from Metal Seal. Responding to the complaint, Sensata denied that it agreed to a minimum-quantities requirement. Sensata also alleged that the minimum-quantities requirement was unenforceable because it was based on Metal Seal’s fraud. According to Sensata, while negotiating the MOU, Metal Seal falsely represented that its insurer required that any contract with Sensata include minimum volumes of components.
Metal Seal moved for summary judgment on Sensata’s G.L. c. 93A and fraud claims. Metal Seal also moved for summary judgment on Sensata’s affirmative defense based on Metal Seal’s alleged “material misrepresentations.”
In Caper v. Foley Lardner, LLP, Adam Caper is suing his attorneys, claiming that they committed malpractice, breached their fiduciary duties, made misrepresentations (negligent and intentional), and violated G.L. c. 93A. Caper’s theory is twofold. Caper alleges that his attorneys committed malpractice when they advised him that he could defer salary payments to his business’s chief operating officer. Caper also alleges that his attorneys stopped legal work, focused on refinancing his business, to coerce him to release his malpractice claim.
In Cabrera v. Auto Max, Carlos Cabrera moved to certify a class of Auto Max vehicle purchasers who did not receive disclosures informing them that their vehicles had suffered structural/frame damage. Auto Max’s alleged failure to provide those disclosures, Cabrera alleged, violated 940 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 3.05(1) and 3.16(2)—and, in turn, G. L. c. 93A.
Judge Kaplan denied the class-certification motion for two main reasons.
In Steward Health Care System v. CHSPSC, Judge Sanders found that CHSPSC, an affiliate of Community Health Systems (CHS), is subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts for claims made under transition-services agreement (TSAs) signed along with an asset-purchase agreement (APA).
Under the APA between Steward Health Care System LLC (Steward) and CHSPSC, Steward agreed to purchase eight hospitals outside Massachusetts. Under the TSAs between the same parties, CHSPSC agreed to provide services to facilitate the transition of the hospitals.
This month, Judge Karen Green is replacing Judge Mitchell Kaplan as the judge for the January - June rotation of BLS1. Governor Charlie Baker appointed Judge Green to the Superior Court in 2016. Before her appointment, Judge Green was a senior partner in Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP’s Boston office where she focused her practice on complex business litigation. During her legal career, she served in various public service positions, including as an Assistant US Attorney. More information about Judge Green can be found here.
In B. Bullen et al. v. CohnReznick LLP, investors in a defunct hedge fund sued CohnReznick, the outside auditor and accountant of the fund. The investors claimed, among other things, that CohnReznick had conspired with the fund to defraud its investors. Judge Salinger dismissed the case, ruling that CohnReznick, a New Jersey LLP headquartered in New York, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts.
After prevailing at trial, Cedar Hill Retreat Center sought sanctions against the plaintiffs under G.L. c. 231, § 6F. That statute authorizes a judge to award a moving party reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs if the judge finds that “all or substantially all of the claims, defenses, setoffs or counterclaims . . . made by any party who was represented by counsel . . . were wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good faith.” Judge Salinger denied the motion because he was not convinced that “all or even substantially all of the claims against Cedar Hill were frivolous and not advanced in good faith.”
That is not to say, however, that the court did not find one of the claims “troubling.” Judge Salinger struggled to “discern what good faith basis the [Reed] Foundation had for alleging that Cedar Hill’s challenged activities were in trade or commerce and therefore subject to c. 93A, or that those activities constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices and would have violated c. 93A if the statute applied in the first place.” But even if he assumed that the 93A claim was wholly insubstantial and not asserted in good faith, that was not enough, according to Judge Salinger, to impose § 6F sanctions. Cedar Hill did not show, Judge Salinger wrote, “that all or substantially all of the Reed Foundation’s claims . . . were both frivolous and not asserted in good faith” (emphasis added).
Judge Sanders denied a plaintiff’s motion seeking the court’s blessing of the plaintiff’s confidentiality designations. Pursuant to a confidentiality order, the plaintiff classified as “Confidential — Attorney’s Eyes Only” more than 650,000 pages of documents. The plaintiff claimed that a review of a few hundred of the documents showed that they contained competitively sensitive information. Judge Sanders stated, however, that “the designation of documents as attorney’s eyes only should be sparingly used.” She also explained that the plaintiff failed to show how or why the documents deserved confidentiality protection. At the end of the day, the plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden under the confidentiality order, according to Judge Sanders.
Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc. v. Sheppard, et al. (August 27, 2019)
In Lewis PR v. Murphy, Judge Kaplan quashed the plaintiff’s subpoena requesting 20 months of the defendant’s cell phone records. Judge Kaplan found that the subpoena was abusive and “stunning in its over breadth.”
The plaintiff sued the defendant for alleged breach of a restrictive covenant in an asset purchase agreement. In discovery, the plaintiff subpoenaed Verizon to produce records reflecting all telephone bills, text messages, and call data for the defendant’s personal cell phone for a period of 20 months. The defendant moved to quash the subpoena.
- Senior Editor, Co-Chair, Business Litigation Practice Group