In Parker v. EnerNoc, Inc., Judge Salinger considered the plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees after the plaintiff prevailed on her employment-based claims at trial. According to Judge Salinger, the plaintiff did not submit “any real evidentiary support” for her attorneys’ hourly rates. Judge Salinger nonetheless relied on his own experience of “prevailing market rates for similar services by persons with comparable experience” to determine whether the fees were reasonable.
Last summer, Judge Salinger ruled in Oxford Global Resources, LLC v. Hernandez that a plaintiff employer’s litigation against a former employee belonged in California, not Massachusetts. The defendant was employed in California by the plaintiff, which is headquartered in Massachusetts. Judge Salinger dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds—despite the presence of a Massachusetts choice of law provision and a Massachusetts forum selection provision in the employment agreement.
In a case concerning allegedly unfair student loan collection practices, Judge Salinger concluded that a Pennsylvania public corporation, the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), is a “person” potentially subject to Chapter 93A liability.
In Anesthesia Associates, Judge Salinger rejected the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction because, in essence, the motion constituted a premature creditor’s bill.
In McCarthy v. Genesee & Wyoming Railroad Services, an employee brought a lawsuit against his former employer, alleging that the employer breached the parties’ contract by failing to pay the employee severance benefits. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the contract requires the parties to arbitrate disputes about its enforcement or interpretation. The employee counterargued that the contract, at the very least, is ambiguous. The arbitration provision, according to the employee, conflicts with the contract’s forum-selection provision. That latter provision states that “each party . . . consents to the jurisdiction of a competent court in Massachusetts to hear any dispute arising out of this Agreement.”
A business plaintiff’s assertion of a Chapter 93A claim could boomerang where the plaintiff moves to dismiss a Chapter 93A counterclaim. That’s a key takeaway from Judge Kaplan’s decision in Microsemi Corp. v. Langlois.
In a case concerning alleged violations of the Massachusetts law governing the involuntary towing of motor vehicles, Judge Salinger concluded that the defendant’s “attempt to ‘pick off’ the named plaintiff did not moot [the plaintiff’s] individual claims or the class action.”
In a dispute between a former employee and former employer over violation of a non-compete/non-disclosure agreement and other related claims, Judge Salinger denied the employee’s motion to dismiss under Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP statute, G.L. c. 231, § 59H, finding that none of the employer’s claims were based solely on the employee’s petitioning activity.
“Under Massachusetts law,” Judge Salinger observed in Stone v. Remillard, “a corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders.” In support of that blackletter law, Judge Salinger cited to footnote three of Merola v. Exergen Corp., 423 Mass. 461 (1996).
Judge Salinger granted summary judgment in favor of a defendant that violated Massachusetts debt collection law where a plaintiff failed to show an injury “separate” and “distinct” from the regulatory violation.
- Senior Editor, Co-Chair, Business Litigation Practice Group