Pat Concannon and John Loughnane, partners in Nutter’s Intellectual Property and Corporate and Transactions Departments, respectively, analyzed the significance of the upcoming oral arguments in the Supreme Court case Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC.
In the Q&A, “Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC: Will the Supreme Court Clarify the Rights of Trademark Licensees Upon Rejection?,” Pat and John discussed why there is such great uncertainty on this issue, leading to widely different results among the lower courts; how licensees can protect themselves if a licensor files for bankruptcy; and what they predict will happen in the Tempnology case. According to Pat and John, when licensing trademark rights, you need to think about a host of issues at the outset including the impact of a licensor declaring bankruptcy.
The Federal Circuit rejected the patent venue test recently established by Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas, the judge who has been reported to preside over about one quarter of all patent infringement cases in America. The three judge panel held that Judge Gilstrap abused his discretion and applied an incorrect legal standard in Raytheon Co. v. Cray Inc. when he refused to transfer the patent suit after applying his own four-factor test and determined defendant Cray maintained “a regular and established place of business” in the district where only one of its employees worked from home. As a result of its findings, the Federal Circuit ordered the case to be transferred.
Written opinions of counsel are gaining renewed interest as a valuable tool for avoiding enhanced damages for willful patent infringement following the Halo decision. A written opinion may set forth the factual and legal basis for finding a third party patent not infringed, invalid, and/or unenforceable. However, to be effective, the timing of the opinion may be critical.
In a recent decision denying defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, the District of Massachusetts interpreted its local rule regarding the district’s filing deadline. The decision gives guidance to litigators regarding the use of the court’s electronic filing system.
- Despite the fact that no Local Rule for the District of Massachusetts expressly addresses the question of after-hours electronic service, the 6:00 p.m. filing deadline provides a “useful—and sensible—analogy for timeliness of electronic service.” Service on opposing parties should generally be filed by 6:00 p.m. of the due date.
The Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently denied a petitioner’s request under 28 USC § 1782 to take discovery related to patent inventorship in connection with an Opposition proceeding pending before the European Patent Office (EPO). The court, in exercising its discretion under the U.S. Supreme Court’s so-called Intel factors set forth in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 US 241, 264 (2004), denied the petitioner’s request for discovery because the EPO generally does not allow the type of discovery requested by the petitioner in an Opposition proceeding, thus the petitioner’s requested discovery would have no place in an EPO Opposition.
- This case illustrates the need for inventors to be familiar with patent laws, procedures, and proceedings in foreign jurisdictions.
- The District of Massachusetts will focus on Intel’s discretionary factors when making decisions about whether to allow discovery for use in foreign tribunals under 28 USC § 1782.
In Zircore, LLC v. Straumann Manufacturing, Inc. (E.D. Tex. 2017), as in many patent litigations since Mayo, Myriad, and Alice, the defendant moved to dismiss the infringement allegations contending that the patents in suit are ineligible subject matter under 35 USC § 101. Here, despite Straumann’s assertion that Zircore’s U.S. Patent No. 7,967,606 was invalid under § 101 as directed to an abstract idea, the court found that the claims were patent eligible under § 101 as directed to a method of manufacturing a physical object.
Since the Supreme Court decision in Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics came down earlier this year (as previously discussed here), district courts across the country have been grappling with the high court’s new standard for determining willful infringement and awarding enhanced damages in patent cases. In the District of Massachusetts, only one case to date has interpreted this new standard, Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd.
Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., once again changing patent law by loosening the standard by which district courts may award enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284. In so doing, the Court discarded the two-part test set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The so-called Seagate test first requires that the patentee show by clear and convincing evidence that an infringer’s actions were objectively unreasonable. If this burden is met, the patentee must then prove that the infringer subjectively knew or should have known that its actions risked infringing a valid patent. If a patent holder is able to meet both prongs of the test, any enhancement of damages is subject to the discretion of the district court. Appellate review of such determinations involves a tripartite standard, in which the determination of objective recklessness is reviewed de novo, the determination of subjective knowledge is reviewed for substantial evidence, and any award of enhanced damages is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Maximizing the protection and value of intellectual property assets is often the cornerstone of a business's success and even survival. In this blog, Nutter's Intellectual Property attorneys provide news updates and practical tips in patent portfolio development, IP litigation, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and licensing.